This paper explores how income distribution affects market structure, prices, and economic well-being of different consumer groups. I consider a general equilibrium model of monopolistic competition with free entry, heterogenous firms and consumers that share identical but nonhomothetic preferences. The results in the paper suggest that poverty reduction might be of a greater importance than lowering income inequality, as lower income inequality does not necessarily lead to welfare gains of the poor. In particular, I show that higher income inequality may benefit the poor via a trickle-down effect operating through the entry of firms into the market.
Introduction
What are the possible consequences of income redistribution for market structure, consumption allocation, and welfare? As Atkinson and Bourguignon (2000) argue, "it is di¢ cult to think of economic issues without distributive consequences and it is equally di¢ cult to imagine distributive problems without some allocational dimension". There is a large empirical and theoretical literature that relates income distribution and inequality to a number of social and economic outcomes.
1 Alesina and Rodrik (1994) show that a rise in income inequality has a negative impact on economic growth (see also Persson and Tab ellini (1994) ). Waldmann (1992) argues that the level of inequality is positively correlated with infant mortality. Glaeser et al. (2003) …n d that high inequality can negatively a¤ect social and economic progress through the subversion of institutions in the economy. This paper provides another insight into the interaction between income distribution and economic outcomes, which has not been explored extensively. In particular, I show that higher income inequality may bene…t the poor via a trickle-down e¤ect operating through entry. This …n d i n g suggests that since lower income inequality does not necessarily lead to poverty reduction, focusing on poverty reduction might be more important than focusing on income inequality.
I consider a general equilibrium model of monopolistic competition with heterogenous …r m s and consumers. I assume that all consumers share identical but non-homothetic preferences and di¤er in their incomes.
2 Nonhomotheticity of the preferences and income heterogeneity imply that changes in prices may a¤ect di¤erent groups di¤erently. Furthermore, the presence of market power induces variable markups across …r m s , which are in turn a¤ected by the income distribution. As a result, changes in the income distribution may have di¤erent consequences for di¤erent groups of agents.
I adopt the preference structure from Murphy et al. (1989) and Matsuyama (2000) . The basic idea is that goods are indivisible and consumers buy at most one unit of each good. This implies that given the prices, goods are arranged so that consumers can be considered as moving down some list in choosing what to buy. For instance, in developing countries, consumers …r s t buy food, then clothing, then move up the chain of durables from kerosene stoves to refrigerators, to cars. Hence, the consumer utility can only be increased by the consumption of a greater number of goods. Moreover, consumers with higher income purchase the same set of goods as consumers with lower income plus some others.
This structure of consumer preferences has enough ‡e x i b i l i t y to be applied as to the whole economy as to a certain industry where goods di¤er in quality. On the one hand, each good can be interpreted as a distinct good sold in the market. In this case, the structure describes the whole economy. On the other hand, we might think that …r m s sell not distinct goods but some characteristics of a good produced in a certain industry. For instance, consider a car industry. Each good can be treated as some characteristic of a car. The poor purchase main characteristics associated with a car, while the rich buy the same characteristics as the poor plus some additional luxury characteristics. That is, both groups of consumers buy the same good but of di¤erent quality.
I assume that goods di¤er in terms of the valuations consumers attach to them. By the valuation of a good, I mean the utility delivered to consumers from the consumption of one unit of this good. That is, there are goods that are more essential in consumption (necessities) and goods that are less essential (luxuries). There is free entry in the market. To enter the market, ex ante identical …r m s have to make costly investments that are sunk. Once …r m s enter, they learn about the valuations attached to their goods. The only source of …r m ex-post heterogeneity is the di¤erence in the valuations placed on their goods. 3 Depending on the valuations drawn, …r m s choose whether to stay or to leave the market. Firms that decide to stay engage in price competition with the other …r m s . This leads to the endogenous distribution of markups, which is a¤ected not only by the market size, but also by the income distribution in the economy. Hence, the model incorporates two key features: imperfect competition and non-homothetic preferences, which allow us to analyze the e¤ects of changes in income distribution on equilibrium prices, market structure, and welfare of di¤erent groups.
The paper focuses on the case with two types of consumers: rich and poor. 4 Depending on the valuations of their goods, …r m s are endogenously divided into three groups in the equilibrium. Firms with high valuations choose to serve all consumers. Firms with medium valuations decide to sell only to the rich. Finally, …r m s with low valuations leave the market.
In the paper, I analyze the e¤ects of changes in the income and the fraction of the rich on the welfare of poor consumers. A rise in the income level of the rich has two e¤ects. First, it leads to redistribution of …r m s across the groups. Second, more …r m s enter into the market, which in turn results in tougher competition. The former e¤ect is negative for the poor, while the latter is positive. I show that the second e¤ect prevails and as a result, the poor gain from a rise in the income of the rich. This is reminiscent of the trickle-down e¤ect in Aghion and Bolton (1997) , who show that in the presence of imperfect capital markets, the accumulation of wealth by the rich may be good for the poor. The e¤ect of additional …r m entry on welfare arises in models with homothetic preferences as well. For instance, in Melitz (2003) higher income of a certain group would result in more entry, tougher competition, and, thereby, higher welfare of all consumers. However, there is a di¤erence. In the present paper, if the mass of …r m s is unchanged (the short run), then there is only a negative impact on the poor resulting in welfare losses. While in models with homothetic preferences, if the mass of …r m s is …x e d , higher income of certain consumers does not a¤ect welfare of the others. In addition, in the present model, higher income of the rich raises the markups of …r m s selling only to the rich and decreases the markups of …r m s serving all consumers, while in traditional models, we observe the same or no impact on …r m s ' m a r k u p s . Another interesting question is to compare welfare of the poor in economies with di¤erent fractions of the rich. What is better for the poor: tiny minority or vast majority of the rich? Speci…cally, keeping the consumer incomes …x e d , I consider a rise in the fraction of the rich and explore its implications for the poor. As before, there are two e¤ects. First, some …r m s that served all consumers …n d it more pro…table to sell only to the rich. This redistribution decreases welfare of the poor. Second, the larger fraction of the rich results in more …r m s entering the market. This in turn leads to tougher competition and, therefore, increases welfare of poor consumers. I …n d that if the fraction of the rich is su¢ ciently small, then the positive e¤ect prevails and as a result, the poor bene…t from a higher fraction of the rich. While if the fraction of the rich is su¢ ciently high, the opposite happens. Hence, we might expect that welfare of the poor has an inverted U shape as a function of the fraction of the rich.
There is a common feature of both comparative statics considered above. An increase in the personal income as well as in the fraction of the rich raises the aggregate income in the economy. In the view of policy implications, I explore the e¤ects of changes in the income distribution keeping the aggregate income constant. To capture a pure redistribution e¤ect, I consider a rise in the personal income of the rich together with a decrease in the fraction of the rich keeping aggregate income …x e d . I show that these changes in the income distribution result in higher welfare of the poor. That is, higher income inequality may bene…t the poor. The e¤ect is based on the entry of …r m s in the market. In particular, I show that the changes considered result in more entry and, therefore, tougher competition in the market. This in turn reduces the prices of the necessities increasing welfare of the poor.
The related literature in this area can be divided into three strands. First, there are papers that consider monopolistic competition models assuming homothetic or quasi-linear preferences (see for instance Melitz (2003) and Melitz and Ottaviano (2005) ). However, in traditional models of monopolistic competition, income distribution plays no role. If preferences are identical and homothetic, it is well understood that the distribution of income does not affect equilibrium: only aggregate income matters. When preferences are quasilinear, the presence of a numeraire good eliminates the impact of income distribution on equilibrium outcomes. Hence, in those models, any price changes have the same impact on all consumers regardless of whether consumers have identical incomes or not.
The second group of papers explores the implications of non-homothetic preferences in a perfectly competitive environment. Meanwhile, in a perfectly competitive environment, di¤erences in the equilibrium prices are fully determined by …r m technological di¤erences (in our case, by di¤erences in the valuations of goods) and …r m pro…ts are equal to zero. Therefore, there is no room for the e¤ects of income distribution on the entry of …r m s and output prices.
Finally, the third group of papers deals with both monopolistic competition and non-homothetic preferences. Markusen (1986) extends the Krugman type model of trade with monopolistic competition by adding non-homothetic demand. He examines the role of income per capita in interindustry and intraindustry trade. Mitra and Trindade (2005) also consider a model of monopolistic competition with non-homothetic preferences. However, they directly assume the functional relationship between consumer income and its share spent on a certain type of goods, without deriving the dependence from the consumer maximization problem. Ramezzana (2000) uses the similar preference structure to explore how similarities in per capita incomes a¤ect trade volumes between countries. In his paper, consumers are identical within a country. As a result, the e¤ects of income inequality are assumed away.
Fo ellmi and Zweimueller (2004) develop a general equilibrium model with non-homothetic preferences and …x ed mass of identical …r m s . They show that depending on the parameters in the model, higher income inequality has either no impact on …r m markups or increases them. In contrast, the …n d i n g s in my paper suggest that this is not necessarily the case. In fact, higher income inequality a¤ects the prices set by …r m s di¤erently. Due to free entry, higher income inequality may raise markups for …r m s that sell their goods only to the rich and reduce markups for …r m s that sell their goods to all consumers. Fo ellmi and Zweimueller (2006) examine a dynamic variation of Murphy et al. (1989) . Assuming learning by R&D, they focus their analysis on the link between possible growth and inequality. In my paper, I address di¤erent questions. I do not consider the learning by R&D spillover and explore the impact of income distribution on the level of competition, markups, and individual welfare.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces basic concepts of the model. Section 3 focuses on the case with two types of consumers, rich and poor, and analyzes the e¤ects of income distribution on market structure and individual welfare. Section 4 concludes.
The Model
I consider a general equilibrium model of monopolistic competition with heterogenous …r m s and consumers. The preference structure is adopted from Murphy et al. (1989) and Matsuyama (2000) .
Production
The timing in the model is as follows. There is free entry in the market. To enter the market, …r m s have to make sunk investments f e . If a …r m incurs the costs of entry, it obtains a draw b of the valuation of its good from a common distribution G(b) with the support on [0; B]. This is meant to capture the idea that before they enter, …r m s do not know how well they will end up doing, as they do not know how highly consumers will value their products. I assume that G 0 (b) = g(b) exists. The valuation b is interpreted as the utility delivered to consumers from the consumption of one unit of the good. Depending on the valuation they draw, …r m s choose to leave the market or to stay. Firms that decide to stay compete in price with the other …r m s . The only factor of production is labor. I assume that marginal costs of production are the same for all …r m s and equal to c, i.e., it takes c e¤ective units of labor (which are paid a wage of unity) to produce a unit of any good. Consumers di¤er in the number of e¢ ciency units of labor they are endowed with.
7 I assume that there are N types of consumers indexed by n: A consumer of type n is endowed with I n e¢ ciency units of labor. I choose indices so that I n > I n 1 . Let us denote n as the fraction of type n consumers in the aggregate mass L. Then, the total labor supply in the economy in e¢ ciency units is L P N i=1 i I i :
Consumption
All consumers have the same non-homothetic preferences given by the utility function
where is the set of available goods in the economy, b(!) is the valuation of good !, and x(!) 2 f0; 1g is the consumption of good !: Each consumer owns a balanced portfolio of shares of all …r m s . Due to free entry, the total pro…ts of all …r m s are equal to zero in the equilibrium. This implies that the value of any balanced portfolio is equal to zero. Thus, all consumers have the same wealth, while their incomes vary with their productivity. To simplify the notation, I assume that consumers have equal shares of all …r m s . Let us denote as the total pro…ts of all …r m s in the economy. Given the prices of available goods, a type n consumer maximizes Z
where p(!) is the price of good !. The utility maximization problem merely involves moving down the list of products ordered by their valuation to price ratios,
, until all income is exhausted.
can assume that marginal costs are also drawn from some common distribution. 7 Throughout the paper, I use terms, endowments of e¢ ciency units of labor and labor productivities, interchangeably.
The Case with Two Types of Consumers
As the analysis of the general case with N types is quite complicated (see Appendix B for details), I focus on the case with two types of consumers: a high-income (high productivity) type and a low-income type. The productivity of the high-income type is de…ned by I H , the productivity of the low-income type is I L . Given the preferences, all goods consumed by the less productive type are also consumed by the more productive type. Thus, goods in the economy can be divided into two groups: the "common" group includes goods that are consumed by all consumers; the "exclusive" group includes goods that are only consumed by high-income consumers.
A …r m producing a good ! obtains the pro…ts of (p(!) c)Q(!), where Q(!) is demand for good !. If all consumers buy the good, then the demand is L: If only the rich purchase it, the demand is H L, where H is the fraction of the high-income type. Hence, Q(!) 2 fL; H L; 0g (demand is equal to zero if the price is so high that nobody wants to purchase good !). Taking the valuation to price ratios of the other …r m s as given, …r m s choose prices to maximize their pro…ts. The following proposition holds.
Proposition 1 In the equilibrium, goods from the same group have the same valuation to price ratio.
Proof. Suppose not. Then, there exists some group, in which there are at least two goods with di¤erent
ratios. Since both goods belong to the same group, a …r m producing the good with higher
can raise its p(!) without a¤ecting the demand. This in turn would increase its pro…ts and, thereby, contradicts to the equilibrium concept.
De…ne V C as the valuation to price ratio of goods from the "common" group and V E as valuation to price ratio of goods from the "exclusive" group. Note that V C and V E are endogenous and V C is strictly greater than V E .
8 Hence, if a …r m with valuation b(!) serves all consumers, then its price is equal to
and its pro…ts are given by
while if the …r m serves only the rich, its pro…ts are given by
As V C > V E , the …r m chooses between selling to more people at a lower price and selling to fewer of them but at a higher price. In other words, …r m s choose
g to maximize their pro…ts taking V C and V E as given. Notice that in the equilibrium, the price of good ! depends only on b(!). Therefore, hereafter I omit the notation of ! and consider prices as a function of b.
Let b M be the unique solution of the equation
Then,
That is, if a …r m draws b b M , then the …r m …n d s it more pro…table to serve both types of consumers. Otherwise, the …r m chooses to serve only the rich. A …r m with valuation b M of its good is indi¤erent between selling to all consumers and selling only to the rich (see Figure 1) . Hence, even in the presence of market power, products have a natural hierarchy. Consumers …r s t purchase goods with higher b, which are more essential in consumption. This result is supportive of the common intuition that the poor spend most of their income on necessities, while the rich can a¤ord to buy not only necessities, but also luxuries.
Let us denote a function V (b) equal to Figure 2 , where b L 0 is the cuto¤ level meaning that …r m s with b < b L exit because of negative potential pro…ts. 9 Notice that in the equilibrium,
implying that all …r m s would choose to sell only to the high-income consumers. 
The Equilibrium
Let us denote M e as the mass of …r m s entering the market. One can think of M e as that there are M e g(b) di¤erent …r m s with a certain valuation b. In the equilibrium, several conditions should be satis…ed. First, as there is free entry in the market, the ex ante expected pro…ts of …r m s have to be equal to zero. Second, the goods market clears. Since the poor consume only goods from the "common" group, the aggregate cost of the bundle of goods from the "common" group should be equal to the income of a poor consumer. Similarly, the aggregate cost of the bundle of all available goods in the economy should be equal to the income of a rich consumer.
De…nition 1
The equilibrium of the model is de…ned by the price function
and the valuation to price ratios V C and V E such that 1) The ex ante expected pro…ts of …r m s are equal to zero.
2) The goods market clears.
Next, I derive equations that satisfy the equilibrium conditions and show that there exists a unique equilibrium in the model. Let 
. From (1), we can express V C as a function of b L and b M : As a result, the following lemma holds.
Lemma 1 In the equilibrium,
Since …r m s with valuation b M have the same pro…ts from selling to all consumers as from selling only to the rich, the price function has a jump at b M ; i.e., to compensate for lower demand, …r m s raise their prices (see Figure  3 ). This results in the nonmonotonicity of the price function. 
Due to free entry in the market, the ex ante expected pro…ts of …r m s are equal to zero in the equilibrium. Using the results from Lemma 1 and taking into account that …r m s with b < b L exit, I obtain
which is equivalent to
where
The goods market clearing condition implies that
The aggregate cost of the bundle of goods from the "common" group is equal to the income of a poor consumer, while the aggregate cost of the bundle of all available goods in the economy is equal to the income of a rich consumer. Dividing the second line in (3) by the …r s t one and using Lemma 1,
Hence, given the exogenous parameters I H , I L , H , f e , c, L, and the distribution of draws G( ), we can …n d endogenous b M and b L from the system of equations, which is given by
The following lemma states the existence and uniqueness of the equilibrium.
Lemma 2 The system of equations (4) has a unique solution.
Proof. In Appendix A.
Once b M and b L are found, V C and V E can be derived using the results in Lemma 1. Finally, the mass of …r m s can be found from (3) :
Income Inequality and We l f a r e
Before exploring the e¤ects of income inequality on the market structure and welfare, I examine how consumer welfare and income inequality are determined in the model.
We l f a r e
Given the preference structure, welfare of a certain consumer is equal to the sum of the valuations of goods she consumes. In this way, welfare of a poor consumer is equal to
. This implies
Welfare of a poor consumer naturally rises with an increase in either her income or the valuation to price ratio of goods she consumes. Similarly, welfare of a rich consumer is given by
As the rich consume the same bundle of goods as the poor plus some others, welfare of the rich is equal to welfare of the poor plus additional welfare from the consumption of the "exclusive" goods, which is in turn equal to income spent on these goods multiplied by their valuation to price ratio. Notice that all changes in individual welfare are divided into two components: an income e¤ect and a price e¤ect. The price e¤ect is determined by
As it can be seen, the income inequality is increasing in the income di¤erence I H I L and has an inverted U shape as a function of H . Further, I express the variance in terms of the aggregate income per capita, the fraction of the rich, and the income of the poor. The aggregate income per capita is given by
Hence, the variance can be rewritten as follows
The expression in (8) implies that keeping the aggregate income …x e d , a rise in I H together with a decrease in H raise the income inequality in the economy.
In the next sections, I examine the impact of income inequality on market structure and individual welfare. Since in the paper I focus on the e¤ects on welfare of poor consumers, in the subsequent analysis I assume away the income e¤ect for the poor. Speci…cally, I keep the income of the poor …x e d and only consider changes in H and I H . Recall that while changes in H a¤ect consumer welfare only through the price e¤ect, changes in I H a¤ect welfare through both the price and the income e¤ects.
Changes in the Income of the Rich
If the rich get even richer, do the poor gain or lose? What is the impact on the prices? In this section, I consider a rise in the income of the rich I H . From (5), higher I H a¤ects welfare of the poor only through changes in the prices of the "common" goods. Two opposite e¤ects in ‡uence these prices. First, since I H rises, some …r m s that used to sell their goods to all consumers …n d it more pro…table to sell only to the rich. This reduces competition among …r m s serving all consumers and, therefore, raises the prices of the "common" goods. Second, higher income of the rich results in higher expected pro…ts of …r m s . This in turn implies that more …r m s enter the market inducing tougher competition and reducing the prices. I show that the latter e¤ect prevails over the former one. As a result, higher I H positively a¤ects V C increasing welfare of the poor.
Meanwhile, a rise in I H a¤ects the rich through both the price and the income e¤ects. Higher income of the rich allows …r m s that sell only to the rich to raise their prices. In spite of higher entry in the market, the prices of the "exclusive" goods rise and as a result, V E falls. However, the income e¤ect is stronger than the price e¤ect and as a result, the rich bene…t from higher I H . Similar intuition works if we consider changes in I L : An increase in I L raises the prices of the "common" goods and decreases the prices of "exclusive" goods. The poor and the rich are better o¤ (see details in Appendix A). The following proposition summarizes the …n d i n g s above.
Proposition 2 A rise in the income of the rich reduces (raises) the prices of the "common" ("exclusive") goods increasing welfare of all consumers.
The intuition behind the results above may also work in traditional models with homothetic preferences. For instance, in Melitz (2003) , higher income of a certain group of consumers would result in higher entry, tougher competition, and, thereby, higher welfare of all consumers. However, there are some di¤erences. In the present model, higher income of the rich raises the markups of …r m s selling only to the rich and decreases the markups of …r m s serving all consumers. In traditional models, we would observe the same or no impact on …r m s ' m a r k u p s . Furthermore, assume for a moment that the mass of …r m s does not change in the model. 11 In this case, higher income of the rich raises prices of all goods and the poor are worse o¤. While in traditional models, if we …x the mass of …r m s , then higher income of one group of consumers does not a¤ect welfare of the rest.
11 To some extent, this case can be interpreted as a short run version of the model.
Changes in the Fract i on of the Rich
This section focuses on how changes in H a¤ect welfare of the poor. From (5), a rise in H a¤ects the poor through the price e¤ect. First, higher H raises the …r m pro…ts from serving rich consumers. As a result, some …r m s switch from serving all consumers to serving only the rich. This reduces competition among …r m s selling the "common" goods and, consequently, raises the prices of the "common" goods. Second, a higher fraction of the rich results in higher ex ante expected pro…ts and, therefore, increases entry in the market inducing tougher competition and lower prices of all goods. Remember that in the previous section, I show that the negative e¤ect on the prices of "common" goods always dominates the positive one. In the present case, it is not necessarily true. In particular, I show that in a neighborhood around H = 0, a rise in H increases welfare of the poor. While in a neighborhood around H = 1, higher fraction of the rich decreases welfare of poor consumers. Thus, the following proposition holds.
Proposition 3 If H is close to zero (close to one), a rise in H decreases (increases) the prices of the "common" goods increasing (decreasing) welfare of the poor.
The last proposition suggests that welfare of the poor has an inverted U shape as a function of H .
12 However, because of mathematical di¢ culties arising in the analysis, I cannot strictly prove this conjecture. Instead, I make a number of numerical exercises where I consider welfare of the poor as a function of H . The results are supportive of the claim that welfare of the poor has an inverted U shape as a function of H .
13
The fact that …r m s endogenously choose the type of consumers to serve makes the results regarding changes in H di¤erent from those that might be obtained in traditional models with homothetic preferences. In Melitz (2003) , 12 While a rise in H has an ambiguous impact on the poor, the rich always bene…t from it. See details in Appendix A. 13 Speci…cally, it appears that the sign of (W p ) higher fraction of the rich would lead to higher welfare of the poor in the long run and has no impact in the short run (when the mass of …r m s is …x e d ) . In this model, we observe an ambiguous impact of H on the poor in the long run and a negative impact in the short run.
Changes in the Income and the Fract i on of the Rich (Keeping the Aggregate Income Fixed)
There is a common feature for both comparative statics considered above. A rise in I H as well as a rise in H increases the aggregate income in the economy. To capture a pure redistribution e¤ect, I consider a rise in the personal income of the rich together with a decrease in the fraction of the rich keeping the aggregate income in the economy …x e d . 14 I show that these changes in the income distribution result in higher entry in the market and, therefore, higher welfare of the poor.
To understand the intuition behind better, I …r s t consider the short run implications of the changes in the income distribution. From the previous sections, we know that in the short run, higher I H decreases welfare of the poor, while lower H increases it. Thus, two e¤ects work in opposite directions. However, it appears that the impact of I H is always stronger than that of H . Here the assumption that aggregate income is unchanged plays a key role. 15 14 Another exercise that holds the aggregate income unchanged is to examine changes in the incomes of the rich and the poor keeping the fraction of the rich …x e d . I do not focus on this exercise, as the main goal of this paper is to explore the e¤ects on welfare of the poor. However, if we consider a rise in I H and a decrease in I L holding AG constant, then we might expect that the income e¤ect prevails over the price e¤ect. That is, the rich gain and the poor lose. Furthermore, since the poor consume on average more valuable goods than the rich do, the changes in the incomes substitute the consumption of more valuable goods for the consumption of less valuable goods. As a result, given that bg(b) is increasing in b, total welfare in the economy may decrease. 15 The heuristic proof is as follows. Recall that welfare of a poor consumer is given by
Since in the short run M e is …x e d , we only need to examine the e¤ects
From the goods market clearing condition,
In the short run, only …r m s that were active before may operate in the market. Therefore, in the short run, b L is unchanged. Moreover, as aggregate income in the economy is unchanged, H (I H I L ) does not change as well. This implies that in
As a result, a rise in c(1
This implies that in the short run, the poor are worse o¤ from the changes in the income distribution considered. What is about the long run? On the one hand, higher income of the rich allows …r m s to impose higher prices of their goods and, consequently, leads to more entry in the market. On the other hand, lower fraction of the rich reduces the demand for the "exclusive" goods making ex ante expected pro…ts lower. This results in lower entry in the market. As in the previous section, I focus on the analysis of two extreme cases: H 0 and H 1. I show that in these cases, the impact of I H prevails over that of H leading to more entry in the market. Moreover, I show that the positive e¤ect on welfare of the poor from more entry is stronger than the negative short run e¤ect. These results are derived for the neighborhoods of H = 0 and H = 1 and an arbitrary distribution function G(b). However, if we limit the analysis to the cases when bg(b) is increasing in b, then the results hold for any H 2 [0; 1]. 16 The next proposition summarizes these …n d i n g s . Proof. In Appendix A.
The assumption that bg(b) is increasing in b has a strong economic interpretation. It implies that g(b) does not decrease too fast; i.e., the probability of getting higher values of b does not decrease too fast with b. Moreover, in some sense, utility from the consumption of all goods with a certain valuation b is equal to M e bg(b). Hence, this assumption also guarantees that this utility increases with b.
Entry Costs, Market Size, and We l f a r e
In this paper, the impact of the costs of entry and market size on consumer welfare is the same as in traditional models. However, the present model implies that changes in market size or entry costs have di¤erent magnitudes for di¤erent types of consumers. In this section, I brie ‡y describe the e¤ects . 16 For instance, a family of power distributions satis…es this condition. of changes in f e and L on individual welfare and focus on the e¤ects on the relative welfare.
An increase in the costs of entry f e reduces the ex ante expected pro…ts of …r m s . This in turn decreases the mass of …r m s entering the market and reduces the intensity of competition. As a result, the prices of goods from both groups rise and welfare of all consumers falls. An increase in L results in higher ex ante expected pro…ts of …r m s . This leads to the higher number of …r m s entering the market and tougher competition. The prices of goods from both groups fall and consumers of both types are better o¤. Finally, any changes in f e and L such that the ratio f e L remains the same do not change the prices and individual welfare. Two opposite e¤ects completely compensate each other (see (4)). The following proposition holds.
Proposition 5 Larger countries and countries with lower entry costs tend to have higher individual welfare.
In the next section, I examine the e¤ect of fe L on the relative welfare of the rich with respect to the poor.
Relative We l f a r e
The relative welfare of the rich with respect to the poor is given by
Note that welfare inequality is divided into two components: income inequality and consumption inequality. The income inequality is determined by the ratio
, while the consumption inequality
depends on the relative prices of the "exclusive" goods with respect to the "common" goods. Hence, changes in the parameters in the model may a¤ect either type of inequality or both. For instance, higher income of the rich raises the income inequality but decreases the consumption inequality.
The relative welfare can be rewritten as follows
From (9), changes in
Moreover, this functional relationship does not depend on the ratio fe L
. Hence,
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is positive. Otherwise, depending on the parameters in the model, the sign of
might be either. The following proposition formalizes the …n d i n g s above.
Proposition 6 If
, then the rich gain more from an increase in market size and lose more from an increase in the costs of entry than the poor.
Limiting the analysis to the case when
is always positive, we derive that the rich lose more from an increase in f e L than the poor. To understand the intuition, I separately consider two markets. The …r s t market is the market for goods from the "common" group, while the second one is the market for the "exclusive" goods. I divide the e¤ect of higher f e L into two steps. First, given an increase in f e L , fewer …r m s enter the both markets decreasing b L and b M . Second, due to less competitive pressure, some …r m s that sold their goods only to the rich switch to selling to all consumers. This e¤ect decreases b M even more and in turn reduces competition in the second market allowing …r m s with low valuations to survive. As a result, the cuto¤ b L falls even more as well. However, …r m s that switched from the second market to the …r s t one have relatively high valuations of their goods compared with …r m s that "survived", the prices of these goods were relatively high. This implies that b L has to fall by more than b M to compensate for the di¤erence in the prices. That is, higher
Conclusion
In this paper, I consider a general equilibrium model of monopolistic competition with heterogenous …r m s and consumers. The model incorporates two key features: imperfect competition and non-homothetic preferences, which allow us to analyze the consequences of changes in income distribution on pricing, market structure and, thereby, welfare of di¤erent groups of consumers.
This framework leads to interesting theoretical results that help to understand the impact of income inequality on individual well-being. In particular, I analyze how income inequality in ‡uences welfare of the poor. I show that higher income inequality in the economy may bene…t the poor via a trickledown e¤ect operating through entry. The model also allows us to analyze the e¤ects of changes in market size and entry costs. An increase in market size leads to tougher competition. Therefore, markups of all …r m s fall and welfare of all consumers rises. Similarly, an increase in entry costs reduces the intensity of competition, raises markups, and, thereby, decreases welfare of all consumers. Furthermore, I show that the rich may gain more from an increase in market size and lose more from an increase in entry costs compare to the poor.
There are a number of plausible extensions of this model. For instance, it would be interesting to consider an open economy version of the model. In this case, the paper can be modi…ed in two ways. First, one can explore a model of trade between two countries with di¤erent income distributions and examine how this di¤erence a¤ects the trade patterns. Second, it would be interesting to consider the case when income distribution is endogenous and, for instance, a¤ected by the level of openness. I leave these issues for future work.
Appendix A
In Appendix A, I provide the proofs of the lemmas and the propositions formulated above.
Proof of Lemma 2
The latter implies that F 1 (B) = B. Now, consider
By analogy, let
Hence, the solution of (4) exists and is unique (see Figure 4) .
Comparative Statics
In this section, I use a simplifying notation:
R y x means R y x tdG(t):
Proof of Proposition 2
An increase in I H shifts the curve F 1 (b L ) up, while the curve F 2 (b L ) is unchanged. As a result, b L falls and b M rises (see Figure 5) . The impact on welfare of the poor is not so straightforward. Rewrite (10) and (11) as follows
Notice that equilibrium values of b L and b M solve (12). Using implicit di¤er-entiation, I obtain
Consider
From (13) and (14),
This implies that an increase in I H leads to the lower prices of the "common" goods and higher welfare of the poor, which is equal to I L V C :
From the analysis above, we know that higher I H results in lower b L . That is, the prices of the "exclusive" goods rise. and
. The sign of (W r ) 0 I L is the same as
, an increase in I L raises M e and, thereby,
Proof of Proposition 3
An increase in H shifts the curve F 1 (b L ) up and the curve F 2 (b L ) to the right around 45 degree line (see Figure 6 ). In this case, b M rises. The impact on b L is not so straightforward. There are two opposite e¤ects. The upward shift of
To determine the sign of
The partial derivative of J 2 with respect to b M can be written as follows
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This in turn implies that
, we need to examine the sign of
The derivative of J 2 with respect to b L can be expressed as
Using the expressions (15) and (16), I show that
In addition,
Therefore,
After some simpli…cations,
Hence, the sign of
is the same as the sign of
It is much more complicated to determine the sign of P 5 for all values of H 2 [0; 1].
The E¤ect of Higher H on the Rich
From the previous section, we know that @b L @ H > 0. This means that higher H decreases the prices of the "exclusive" goods. Welfare of the rich is given by
To determine the sign of (W r ) 0 H , we need to examine the sign of
Using the previous results,
After some simpli…cations, it appears that to prove that (W r )
is greater than zero. This is in turn equivalent to
; the mass of …r m s entering the market rises, i.e., (M e )
Proof of Proposition 4
Aggregate income per capita AG is given by
In this way, I rewrite (12) as follows
Hence, it is necessary to explore the impact of a decrease in H on welfare of the poor given new equilibrium equations (17). Using the same technique as in the proof of Proposition 3, I obtain
If H is close to one then P 6 > 0 and
That is, welfare 0 of the poor rises with a decrease in H . This result is also supported by the fact that given su¢ ciently high H , both an increase in I H and a decrease in H have a positive impact on welfare of the poor. Consider
Proof of Proposition 5
A rise in f e shifts the curve F 2 (b L ) to the left, while the curve F 1 (b L ) is unchanged. As a result, b L and b M fall (see Figure 7) . 
Proof of Proposition 6 I need to show that given
H is a positive constant. As for any density function g( ), lim x!0 xg(x) = 0;
Finally, it can be shown that if bg(b) is increasing in b, then for any
Notice that the sign of
This …n i s h e s the proof.
Appendix B
In this section, I consider a general case of the model with N consumer types.
The General Case with N Consumer Types
To complete the model, I consider the general case with N types of consumers. I show the existence and uniqueness of the equilibrium and discuss some issues related to the case when the distribution of e¢ ciency units of labor among consumers is continuous. In the general case, consumers di¤er in the number of e¢ ciency units of labor they are endowed with. A consumer of type n is endowed with I n e¢ ciency units of labor. I choose indices so that I n > I n 1 . Here n is the fraction of consumers of type n in the aggregate mass L of consumers. The equilibrium in the general model is similar to the equilibrium in the simple case considered before. All goods that are consumed by a certain type of consumers are also consumed by more productive consumers. Thus, goods in the economy are divided into N groups. Goods belong to group k = 1::N if they are only consumed by consumers whose type is greater or equal to k. In the equilibrium, goods from the same group have the same valuation to price ratio. Let V k be the valuation to price ratio of goods from group k. Then, in the equilibrium, V (b) looks as in Figure 8 , where b k is such that …r m s with b k are indi¤erent between selling to consumers with types greater or equal to k and selling to consumers with types greater or equal to k + 1. For instance, …r m s with b 1 are indi¤erent between selling to all consumers and selling to 17 Then, the following lemma holds.
Lemma 3 In the equilibrium,
Proof. See below.
In the equilibrium, the expected pro…ts of …r m s are equal to zero. This implies that
In addition, the goods market clearing condition should be satis…ed. This implies that the aggregate cost of the bundle of goods from group k should be equal to income of a consumer of type k. In this way, I obtain
Hence, there is the system of N + 1 equations
b k p(t)dG(t) k = 1::N fe cL
with N + 1 unknowns: fb k g k=1::N and M e .
Proposition 7
The equilibrium in the general model always exists and is unique.
Proof. See details below.
The Continuous Distribution of E¢ ciency Units of Labor
Assume that the distribution of consumer productivities is continuous. Notice that any continuous distribution can be approximated by the sequence of discrete distributions. Therefore, we can interpret equilibrium in the continuous model as the limit of equilibria in the discrete models. In this case, the function V (b) is continuous, increasing on [b explicitly, I need to make a simplifying assumption about the distribution of e¢ ciency units of labor. I assume that this distribution has a constant hazard rate. That is, I consider the family of exponential distributions on [s; 1), where s 0 is the minimum endowment of e¢ ciency units of labor. Since the upper bound of the support is in…nity, the maximum income in the economy is also equal to in…nity. This implies that the cuto¤ b c L equals to zero in the equilibrium. I show that in a neighborhood b = 0, the price function p(b) is decreasing in b and p(0) = 1. Hence, this model gives us a simple straightforward explanation of why some luxury goods with relatively low valuation (or quality) to price ratios are so expensive: the rich are ready to pay such high prices for these goods. 18 Notice that lim b!0 p(b) = 1. This means that goods with the lowest valuations have the highest prices.
Proof of Lemma 3
Demand for goods from group k is equal to L P N i=k i : From the de…nition of the sequence fb k g k=1::N , From the de…nition of k (b) and (21),
Recall that N (b N ) = 0. This implies that 
Proof of Proposition 8
Using Lemma 3, the system of equations (18) can be rewritten as follows 
Consider k = N. Then,
Given M is strictly increasing in M e .
Consider k = N 1. Then,
Given + 1: This implies that there exists a unique solution M e of (25). Therefore, there exists a unique solution of (18).
